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Abstract 
 
 
We use a quadratic form in the key spending variables to estimate optimal 
government spending, using World Value Survey data covering 78 countries.  We 
found that  the average of total public spending for countries of good public 
governance, at 36.45% of GDP, is almost identical to the average of estimates of 
optimal public spending at 36.49%.  However, significant over-spending or 
under-spending is found for individual countries.  Optimal spending on both 
healthcare and that for education increase with population aging.  Spending on 
education is found to reduce optimal healthcare spending.  Per capita GDP 
increases optimal healthcare spending but reduces optimal education spending as 
a percentage of GDP.  An alternative, “iterative” approach to estimating optimal 
government spending found similar optimal spending levels, lending credibility to 
the results.  Interestingly, we also found that within the sample of countries with 
public governance below median, the highest subjective well-being is highest for 
those with the least public spending, which is around 18% of the GDP.  
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1. Introduction:    
 
Governments affect people’s lives.  But do they enhance or undermine people’s lives?  
Countering arguments that governments interfere with free markets and create inefficiency, 
political scientist Benjamin Radcliff (2013) argues that bigger governments, those that offer 
generous social safety nets, allow people to be free from anxiety and to live happier lives.  Ott 
(2015), who reviewed his book, found his statistical evidence convincing.  Perhaps, however, 
Radcliff’s results are not really that surprising.  Prior to Radcliff’s work, economists 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2007) found that in the United States, the well-being of successive 
birth-cohorts had gradually fallen through time, whereas in Europe, where the social safety net 
is far more comprehensive and tuition fees at colleges are mostly non-existent, newer birth-
cohorts were happier.  Blanchflower and Oswald noted that the coefficients about the cohort 
effects were not only statistically significant, but also big quantitatively.   
 
But Radcliff studied only 21 traditional member states of the OECD. All of these countries 
have relatively high government quality, as indicated by the World Bank’s public governance 
indicators.  Do his results apply to other countries, particularly those with lower quality 
governments?  Can we say anything more specific about spending on healthcare and on 
education?  We will try to answer these questions in this paper. 
 
Ott (2010) extended the work of Helliwell and Huang (2008) and found that for his dataset for 
127 countries, “technical quality” of governments, which is based on Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, correlates with 
happiness in both rich and poor nations, while “democratic quality,” which is based on Voice 
and Accountability and Political Stability, only correlates with happiness in richer nations. 2  
He concluded that “quality of government clearly beats size of government in its association 
with average happiness,” but largely left the question open as to what constitutes optimal 
government size.    
 
Helliwell, J. F. et al. (2014), using Gallup World Poll data on 157 countries from 2005-2015, 
shows that changes in the technical quality of government3, but not “democratic quality”, are 
significantly correlated with changes in well-being.  They also found that for rich countries 
democratic quality does have a positive and significant effect on life evaluations, but “delivery 
quality” does not.  For poor countries, on the other hand, the effect of delivery is positive and 
significant, while the effect of democratic quality is zero.  This is consistent with a lack of 
                                                       
2  These are sub‐indices of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator.    See 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home   
3  The authors renamed technical quality “delivery quality of government services.” 
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trust in such countries, and resonates with Helliwell’s earlier work (Helliwell, 2006).   
 
Kim and Kim (2012) found that small and good quality government is the most preferred form 
of government. After this, in descending order are good and big government, bad and small 
government, and finally big and bad government.  We will find that generally these 
conclusions are about right: a government can be too big, even for one that is of high quality.  
But we will try to be more precise in showing the optimal size for different qualities of 
government. 
 
Ott’s result that “technical quality” of governance or delivery dominates democratic quality 
lends support to the thesis that effective governance in the sense of accountability and 
procedural justice in day-to-day decision making is more important than electoral democracy 
(Ho, 2010 in Ho and Bridges, 2010).  Ho (2001, 2012) termed the welfare due to well-
designed institutional arrangements “ex ante welfare”; Frey et.al. (2004) called it “procedural 
utility.”   
 
While economists are agreed that good governance will positively impact welfare, there is 
disagreement about whether government expenditures affect welfare positively or negatively. 
It would seem intuitive that optimal government spending may vary also from country to 
country, depending on things such as demography, stage of development, etc.  We will, in this 
paper, identify how optimal government spending varies with such and other factors.4   
 
While some authors (e.g., Bjornskov et al., 2007) point to the disadvantage of government 
consumption, Ng (2000) emphasizes the inefficiencies of private consumption due to relative 
competition, materialistic bias, and environmental disruption of most production and 
consumption (Cf. Frank 2008, Wendner & Goulder 2008).  If private consumption is 
excessive, by implication government spending may be inadequate.  Consistent with this 
conjecture, Ram (2009) found no support of a negative correlation between happiness and 
government consumption.  Perovic and Golem (2009) found that government spending is 
positively but non-linearly related to happiness in transitional economies.  They stopped short 
of identifying optimal government spending.5  
 
In order to correctly identify the effects of government spending on welfare, we will need to 
build a statistical model that controls for the quality of government, as well as a host of other 
factors, such as relative incomes (income deciles) and demographics.6  More recently, Ho 
                                                       
4  This point was raised by Helliwell in a communication. 
5  Their use of a square term for government spending in the regression does permit such identification, but they 
did not systematically identify optimal government spending. 
6  Easterlin(2001) shows that material goods enhance subjective well-being at least partly through perceptions of 
relative well-being formed by “social comparison.”(p.480)  Our empirical results consistently show that indeed 
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(2014) proposed that since there are both “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” factors that determine a 
person’s subjective well-being, there is a need to control for the “mental qualities” or “mental 
capital” of respondents in addition to situational factors.  Mental capital refers to people’s 
psychological disposition, which is the joint result of genetic, cultural and educational 
influences as well as habits formed over the years.    
 
In this paper, we propose a statistical model that incorporates both intrinsic and situational 
factors, while identifying optimal government expenditures.  Section 2 outlines the theory and 
methodology of the estimation.  Section 3 describes the dataset that we use.  Section 4 
presents the results of the estimation.  Section 5 will present Monte Carlo simulation results 
that offer estimates of the confidence intervals of our estimates.  Finally, Section 6 offers 
further discussions and conclusions. 
 
2. The Theory and the Methodology 
 
Following a well-known UK study (Government Office for Science, UK, 2008), mental capital 
is defined as the totality of an individual’s cognitive and emotional resources.  “It includes 
their cognitive ability, how flexible and efficient they are at learning, and their ‘emotional 
intelligence’, such as their social skills and resilience in the face of stress. It therefore 
conditions how well an individual is able to contribute effectively to society, and also to 
experience a high personal quality of life.”7   By implication, this will affect a person’s 
happiness. 
 
We propose decomposing reported happiness or subjective well-being into two components, a 
“permanent” component, and a “transitory” component. The former can be looked upon as in 
part genetically determined, and in part based on certain mental qualities that may be nurtured 
or cultivated over a long stretch of time.  The totality of these mental qualities, or “mental 
capital,” serves as an input in the production of needed mental goods just as physical capital 
serves as an input in the production of physical goods.  The transitory component, which is 
attributed to circumstances, refers mainly to the extrinsic, situational factors that may have big 
but largely temporary effects on a person’s happiness.  They may include the quality of public 
governance and the amount of public spending, and other non-governmental variables such as 
a person’s employment status, marriage status, health status, religion, occupation, sex, age, etc.   
We first regress subjective well-being, as measured by total life satisfaction, against three 
categories of variables: (a) mental capital variables, (b) socio-economic and demographic 
variables, and finally (c) government quality and government spending variables.  Optimal 
                                                       
income deciles have significant effects on subjective well-being.(Easterlin, 1973, 1974). 
7 Foresight Report: Mental Capital and Well-being, Government Office for Science UK, Executive Summary, 
2008, p.10. 
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government spending is determined by maximizing total life satisfaction with respect to 
government spending using the estimated quadratic equation (the “derivative approach”).  An, 
alternative, “iterative approach,” will be offered as a check for the robustness of the results and 
will be described and reported in the Appendix. Our results show that including the mental 
capital variables immensely improves the statistical results and allows us to derive more 
meaningful and sensible conclusions. 
 
Under the derivative approach, we include the share of government spending in the GDP, and 
the square of this share.  If the share term carries a positive coefficient, and the square of the 
share term carries a negative coefficient, then we can obtain the optimal government spending 
share by equating the first derivative (with respect to the share of government spending in the 
GDP) to zero, since the second-order condition for a maximum will be satisfied.8  We will 
consider the share of healthcare public spending, that of education public spending, and the 
share of overall public spending in turn.  It is not possible to obtain meaningful results if all 
these three “share” variables are included in one equation.   
 
In order to gauge the effects of population aging, developmental stage, and quality of 
governance on optimal government spending, we add three interactive variables: mage.share; 
gdppc.share, and WGI.share, where mage is the median age of the population; share is the 
share of public spending in the GDP, which could be total government spending share (govt), 
public spending on health (health), or public spending on education(edu).  WGI is the 
Worldwide Governance Index, an aggregate governance indicator from World Bank based on 
six dimensions of public governance.  We wanted to test if public education spending (edu) 
might reduce optimal healthcare spending given that better educated people may be better able 
to protect their health (Cheng, et.al. 2014).  So for the equation involving healthcare spending 
(health) we add an interactive term health.edu.   
 
Let government spending be denoted “share,” (which could be govt, health, or edu)9 expressed 
as a percentage of the GDP, median age mage, and GDP per capita as gdppc.  The equation 
with subjective well-being H (“total life satisfaction”) can be estimated as a function of share 
and share2, along with share.mage, share.WGI, and share.gdppc: 
 
 ܪ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ	 ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ൅ ܿ	 ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ଶ	 ൅ ݀	 ݏ݄ܽݎ݁.݉ܽ݃݁ ൅ ݁	 ݏ݄ܽݎ݁. ݃݀݌݌ܿ ൅ ݂	 ݏ݄ܽݎ݁.ܹܩܫ ൅ ݃	 ܆ ൅
ݑ                                   [1] 
 
                                                       
8  We thank Avinash Dixit for suggesting this method.  Altunc, O.Faruk and Celil Aydin (2013) also used this 
method, but the dependent variable was GDP growth and not subjective well-being. 
9  We use public spending and government spending interchangeably, even though some jurisdictions 
differentiate the two.  Public spending is just spending of revenues raised through the government’s authority. 
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where X is a vector of control variables including the mental capital variables and the 
circumstantial variables other than government spending, and u is a random error.   
 
To maximize H, the first-order condition is that the first derivative of equation [1] with respect 
to share has to be equal to zero.  The second-order condition is that the second derivative is 
negative.  This means b is positive and c is negative. Thus, assuming the second-order 
condition is already satisfied, from the first-order condition: 
 
b + 2c share + d mage + e gdppc + f WGI = 0  
 
This implies  2c share = -b - d mage - e gdppc - f WGI.  We can derive optimal share as: 
 
 -b/2c – (d/2c) mage – (e/2c)gdppc –(f/2c)WGI.   
 
We generally would expect optimal health (public) spending (as a % of GDP), for example, to 
rise with aging because older people will need more healthcare.  Optimal healthcare spending 
is also expected to rise with per capita GDP if health is a “superior good” so that people are 
prepared to spend more on health when their incomes rise.  Public governance is expected to 
have a positive effect on healthcare spending because an accountable government attracts more 
trust.  If d, e, and f are positive, then optimal spending will increase with aging, with economic 
development, and with improvement in public governance.  As mentioned above, we add the 
interactive variable health.edu to test the effect of public education spending (edu) on optimal 
healthcare spending.  We expect the interactive coefficient to be negative. 
 
As with many empirical studies, there may be a worry about the endogeneity problem, i.e., 
whether the optimal government spending that we estimate may be biased because happiness 
may also affect government spending.  We would argue that this problem does not really apply 
to our study.  First of all, while governments may be concerned about how they can raise 
happiness, an exogenous rise in happiness should not change government decisions.  There 
are also great variations in the key Total Life Satisfaction measure among the subjects in each 
country, each of whom takes government spending as exogenous.  Moreover, the spending 
shares often owe their origins to historical reasons and political reasons which probably relate 
more to distribution of power and influence than to overall happiness.10  For example, Hong 
Kong's financial secretaries have inherited a rule of spending no more than 20% of the GDP.  
Gilens and Page (2014) found the American government more responsive to the rich and the 
elite than to the man in the street.  
                                                       
10  Meltzer and Richard (1981) showed how politics may work to determine aggregate government spending.   
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3. The Data  
 
In this paper we use data from the 5th and 6th waves of the World Value Survey (2005-2009, 
2010-2014).  We use the individually reported life satisfaction score (scale 1 to 10) in WVS 
as the dependent variable.   
 
To capture the effects of a person’s mental disposition on happiness, we select mental quality 
variables that correspond to Love, Insight, Fortitude, and Engagement, which have been shown 
to correlate strongly with subjective well-being in previous studies (Ho, 2012, 2014). Because 
the WVS is not custom-designed for our study, we select variables that correspond nearest to 
these concepts. 
 
Spending ratios to be tested include public healthcare spending, education spending by 
government, and total public spending, all expressed as percentage of GDP.  If out of the three 
years before the survey, only data for two years is available, we take the average for those two 
years.  If data for only one year is available, then data for that year will be used without 
averaging.  If spending data within the three years before the survey is not available, then the 
data for the year nearest to the year of the survey will be used. 
 
The World Bank provides a summary Worldwide Governance Index (WGI) which covers six 
domains of governance including control of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, and accountability.  
The data is available from 1996 to 2013.  We treat all public spending as government spending, 
and this is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  Data on total government spending are from 
the IMF.  Data on healthcare and education spending, unless otherwise noted, are from World 
Bank. (See Table 7 for details about variable definitions relating to the World Value Survey 
and Table 8 for other variable definitions from other data sources, both tables in Appendix 1.)   
 
In addition, among explanatory variables, we include age (and the square of age, to capture 
non-linear effects of age), sex, education attainment, whether or not religious, marital status 
(married, divorced, separated, or widowed, against the benchmark of being single), 
employment status (full time employed, part time employed, self-employed, retired, housewife, 
or student, against the benchmark of being unemployed), income decile, subjective and 
financial satisfaction.   
 
4. Results:  
 
We first included country dummies along with all the other control variables, but we discovered 
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that including country dummy variables could confound the effects of key explanatory 
variables, and the sign requirements for the key variables in order to identify optimal spending 
may be violated.  In the end we dropped all country dummies.   
 
It may be thought that not controlling for country fixed effects could lead to a bias.  However, 
the cultural factors that affect mental capital are clearly related to country variables.  With the 
mental capital variables included in our equations, we have already controlled for the 
systematic effects of countries on culture and values.  Given that within each country mental 
quality variables may also vary significantly from person to person, we argue that including 
the mental quality variables is superior to including country dummies.  Our regression results 
support this conjecture. 
 
Table 1 presents the key coefficients for calculating optimal spending under the derivative 
approach.  The coefficients are estimated in an ordered probit model with a 10-point scale 
total life satisfaction as the dependent variable.  We use the ordered probit model following 
the well-known work by Blanchflower and Oswald (2007). 11  The coefficients on the 
interactive variables indicate that healthcare spending should be higher (even as a % of GDP) 
for countries with better public governance, higher GDP per capita, and higher median age.  
Education spending is found to reduce optimal healthcare spending.  
 
  
                                                       
11  The ordered probit framework will ensure that the predicted values of total life satisfaction will fall within 
the 1 to 10 scale. 
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Table 1: Estimating Optimal Government Spending on Health and on Education, Based 
on Full Dataset 
 
Coefficients for Key  
Variables under the Derivative 
Approach (Mental Variable 
Included) 
Optimal Spending,  
Algebraic Expression 
Optimal at 
Average WGI, 
gdppc, and 
mage 
Health 
health.WGI:   1.393958 z: 7.07 
0.0066*WGI+0.000000197*
gdppc + 0.000814*mage- 
0.361278*edu+0.0288 
0.0433 
Or 4.3% 
health.gdppc:  0.0000418 z: 4.09 
health.mage:   0.1728409 z: 11.48 
health.edu:    -76.75174 z: -10.87 
health:   6.116038 z: 6.34 
health2:  -106.2225 z: -11.86 
Education 
edu.WGI:     1.511276 z: 9.62 
0.0036*WGI+ 0*gdppc + 
0.000494*mage+0.0252 
0.04178 
Or 4.2% 
edu.gdppc:    -0.0000169 z: -1.82   
edu.mage:     0.209314 z: 15.83    
edu:          10.68168 z: 6.79 
edu2:         -211.9357 z: -12.72 
 
Coefficients for Key  
Variables under the Derivative 
Approach (Mental Variable 
Excluded) 
Optimal Spending, 
Algebraic Expression 
Optimal at 
Average WGI, 
gdppc, and 
mage 
Health 
health.WGI:    2.264965 z: 13.40 
0.0083*WGI+0.000000205*
gdppc +0.00003* mage -
0.267387*edu + 0.0485 
0.04267 
Or 4.3% 
health.gdppc:   0.0000558 z: 6.11 
health.mage:    0.008106 z: 0.59    
health.edu:     -72.77231 z: -11.10 
health:        13.20933 z: 14.96 
health2:       -136.0805 z: -17.04 
Education 
edu.WGI:     1.874867 z: 13.41 
0.0134*WGI+0*gdppc+ 
0.000448*mage+0 
0.01716 
Or 1.7% 
edu.gdppc:    5.27e-06 z: 0.61 
edu.mage:     0.0628038 z: 5.19 
edu:          1.284353 z: 0.87 
edu2:         -70.09287 z:  -4.52 
Note: The average of WGI, GDP per capita, median age and education spending are 
respectively 0.208678, 17703.16, 32.06881 and 0.0456(i.e., 4.56%) 
 
All the coefficients carry the expected signs.  While spending on education should be higher 
with better governed countries, richer countries should spend LESS out of the GDP on 
education because 1% of a rich country’s GDP allows a lot more spending per capita than 1% 
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of a poor country’s GDP does.  It may be thought that countries with a higher median age in 
the population need to spend less on education because there may be fewer school age children.  
But with a smaller labour force these countries may need to spend more in order to boost 
productivity.  The effect of aging on optimal education spending is an empirical question, and 
it turns out that population aging actually INCREASES optimal education spending. 
 
The ordered probit regression equations for the estimation of optimal health spending and 
optimal education spending by the government, which are based on over 105,000 observations 
from the two waves of WVS, are presented as follows (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Ordered Probit Regression on Total Life Satisfaction 
to Identify Optimal Public Spending on Healthcare 
(Full sample) 
  Coefficient z P>|z| Statistical Diagnostics 
Mental  
Capital  
Variables 
Of Each 
Individual 
L_FamImp  0.03535 12.04 0.000 Log likelihood -187120
L_FriImp  -0.00159 -1.13 0.259 Number of obs 99,091
L_HelpOthers  0.00475 2.86 0.004 LR chi2(30)  42090.98
I_Autonomous  -0.00072 -0.67 0.505 Prob > chi2 0.0000
I_EnvirImp  0.02139 14.88 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.1011
F_HardWork  0.00415 3.80 0.000   
E_Creative  0.00453 3.46 0.001   
E_FreeChoice  0.11187 76.34 0.000   
Social-economic 
Variables 
Of Each 
Individual 
healthstatus  0.08164 61.27 0.000   
age  -0.01228 -9.31 0.000   
agesq  0.00014 10.25 0.000   
female  0.04835 6.73 0.000   
edu  -0.00841 -5.40 0.000   
religious  0.05884 7.80 0.000   
married  0.12974 13.06 0.000   
DSorW  -0.01073 -0.77 0.439   
partself  -0.01479 -1.58 0.114   
retired  -0.01273 -0.91 0.365   
housewife  0.09261 7.83 0.000   
student  0.03544 2.36 0.018   
unemployed  -0.05437 -4.30 0.000   
finsat  0.19014 116.74 0.000   
12 
 
incomedecile  0.01426 8.06 0.000   
Public Spending 
and Interactive 
Variables 
health 6.11604 6.34 0.000   
health2 -106.22250 -11.86 0.000   
health.WGI  1.39396 7.07 0.000   
health.gpdppc  0.00004 4.09 0.000   
health.mage 0.17284 11.48 0.000   
health.edu -76.75174 -10.87 0.000   
Wave 5 Dummy Wave5  -0.11341 -15.79 0.000   
Note: Coefficients for cut1 to cut 9 in the ordered probit equation are not reported to save space. 
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Regression on Total Life Satisfaction  
to Identify Optimal Public Spending on Education 
 (Full sample)  
  Coefficient z P>|z| Statistical 
Diagnostics 
 
Mental  
Capital  
Variables 
Of Each 
Individual 
L_FamImp 0.03567 12.22 0.000 Log likelihood -190108
L_FriImp  -0.00186 -1.33 0.184 Number of obs 100,591
L_HelpOthers  0.00435 2.65 0.008 LR chi2(29) 42823.96
I_Autonomous -0.00037 -0.34 0.733 Prob > chi2 0.0000
I_EnvirImp  0.02234 15.77 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.1012
HardWork  0.00446 4.11 0.000   
E_Creative  0.00544 4.18 0.000   
E.FreeChoice  0.11235 77.39 0.000   
Social-economic 
Variables 
Of Each 
Individual 
healthstatus  0.08102 61.34 0.000   
age  -0.01245 -9.51 0.000   
agesq  0.00015 10.37 0.000   
female  0.04663 6.54 0.000   
edu  -0.00907 -5.81 0.000   
religious  0.05966 7.97 0.000   
married  0.12119 12.32 0.000   
DSorW  -0.01580 -1.15 0.250   
partself  -0.01264 -1.36 0.173   
retired  -0.01066 -0.76 0.446   
housewife  0.09996 8.49 0.000   
student  0.03820 2.56 0.011   
unemployed  -0.05649 -4.56 0.000   
finsat  0.19011 117.63 0.000   
incomedecile  0.01615 9.16 0.000   
Public Spending 
and Interactive 
Variables 
eduratio  10.68168 6.79 0.000   
eduratio2  -211.93570 -12.72 0.000   
edu.WGI  1.51128 9.62 0.000   
edu.gdppc -0.00002 -1.82 0.069   
edu.mage  0.20931 15.83 0.000   
Wave 5 Dummy wave5  -0.11071 -15.49 0.000   
Note: Coefficients for cut1 to cut 9 in the ordered probit equation are not reported to save space. 
 
Most of the coefficients carry expected signs.  Among the mental quality variables, 
L_FamImp, indicating the respondent takes family as very important, E_FreeChoice, 
14 
 
indicating the respondents has a sense of free choice and control over one’s destiny, carry very 
significant and positive coefficients.  I_Autonomous, which indicates the degree to which the 
respondent sees himself as an autonomous individual, carries a negative coefficient.  The 
variable actually tends to take on a positive coefficient in good governance countries and a 
negative coefficient in poor governance countries, suggesting that those who aspire for 
autonomy and who live in poor governance countries could be frustrated and become unhappy.  
In the complete sample the negative effect appears to dominate.  Interestingly, I_EnvirImp, or 
taking the environment as important, always carries a very significant positive coefficient, 
suggesting that people who has a longer view and is concerned about sustainability have a 
better sense of balance, may be less ego-centric, and are happier.   
 
If the mental quality variables are dropped, the equation to estimate optimal education spending 
will turn out an insignificant coefficient for the education spending variable.  It will not be 
possible to estimate the amount of optimal spending.  Moreover, the relationship between 
optimal healthcare spending and population aging becomes no longer clear, with insignificant 
coefficient for the interactive variable health.mage (Table 1).  These results lend support to 
our inclusion of mental quality variables. 
 
Using the full sample, it will not be possible to identify the optimal total government spending 
because the first and second-order conditions for optimality are violated.  However, if we 
divide the sample into jurisdictions with WGI higher than median and jurisdictions with WGI 
lower than median, we can identify optimal government spending for the former sample (see 
Table 4) though not for the latter. 
 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Regression on Total Life Satisfaction to Identify Optimal Total 
Government Spending (Above Median WGI Countries Only) 
 
 
Key Variables 
 
Optimal Spending,  
Algebraic Expression 
Optimal at 
Average WGI, 
gdppc, and mage 
Total 
Public 
Spending 
govt.WGI: 0.4937716 z:  11.20 
0.0396*WGI+0*gdppc+0.0
01666*mage+0.2633 
0.36523 
or 36.5% 
govt.gdppc: 6.53e-08 z: 0.05 
govt.mage: 0.02078 z: 5.75 
govt:     3.284948 z:  9.51 
govt2:    -6.237423 z: -11.92 
 
Interestingly, for countries with below median WGI it is not possible to identify optimal total 
government spending using the derivative approach because the first and second-order 
conditions for optimality are violated.  Using the iterative approach we learn that optimal total 
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government spending for these countries seems to be lower than the actual values for any of 
these countries, suggesting “the lower the spending, the better.” 
 
5. Searching for Confidence Intervals 
 
Using the Derivative Method, we obtain estimates of optimal spending based on an equation 
with coefficients which are not independently estimated.  It is therefore not possible to derive 
analytic approximations of the variance of these estimated optimal spending figures calculated 
from the regression results.  Following the advice of a veteran statistics professor, we turn to 
numerical methods.   
 
Stata generates the means vector m and the covariance matrix sigma of coefficients for each 
ordered probit equation that we estimated.  We then use Matlab to generate a large number (1 
million) of random vectors chosen from the multivariate normal distribution with mean m and 
covariance matrix sigma.  Then a 1,000,000 by 5 matrix (or 1,000,000 by 6 for the equation 
to identify optimal healthcare expenditures) containing the random numbers is created.  For 
each of the 1,000,000 trials we calculate the optimal public spending according to the formula, 
and thus derive 1 million possible optimal values.  A histogram is drawn and the distribution 
of these simulated values is found to be close to normal.  We then calculate mean, variance, 
standard deviation, t statistics, and derive the confidence intervals. 
  
Table 5 presents the simulation results and the confidence intervals.  The results suggest that 
the estimates are statistically significant and that the confidence intervals are sufficiently 
narrow for them to be meaningful. 
 
Table 5: Results of Monte Carlo Simulation 
To Identify Confidence Intervals for Estimates of Optimal Spending 
(The following is based on estimates as per Table 1) 
 Mean Variance Standard Deviation t Confidence Interval
Healthcare 
Spending 
(Mental 
Variable 
Included) 
0.04328 1.55E-06 0.001244 34.79 0.04084 0.04571 
Education 
Spending 
(Mental 
Variable 
0.04105 5.21E-07 0.000722 56.86 0.03963 0.04246 
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Included) 
Healthcare 
Spending  
(Mental 
Variable 
Excluded) 
0.04267 7.84E-07 0.000886 48.18 0.04093 0.04440 
Education 
Spending 
(Mental 
Variable 
Excluded) 
0.02592 3.48E-05 0.005903 4.39 0.01435 0.03749 
 (The following is based on estimates as per Table 4) 
 Mean Variance Standard Deviation t Confidence Interval
Total Public 
Spending 
0.36567 3.87E-05 0.006219 58.797 0.35348 0.37786 
 
 
6. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Our investigation of optimal healthcare spending, education spending, and total spending in 
the public sector has produced interesting results.  Optimal government spending (as a % of 
GDP) generally rises with the perceived quality of public governance, and in the case of 
healthcare spending with aging.  Higher GDP per capita would raise the optimal healthcare 
spending but in the full sample regression would have negligible impact on education spending.  
Perhaps somewhat surprising, optimal education spending is found also to rise with population 
aging.  This could be explained by the need to enhance productivity through better quality 
education when the population is more advanced in aging.  
 
We used an alternative, “iterative” approach, to check the robustness of our results.  We found 
largely consistent estimates of optimal public spending.  Some results on optimal total 
government spending using this iterative method are presented in Appendix 1.  Additional 
results for healthcare spending and for education spending are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
Table 6 tests the effects of increasing, one at a time, each of the key parameters that determine 
optimal public spending shares, i.e., WGI, GDP per capita, Median Age, and, for health 
spending only, the Share of Public Spending on Education, by 10% of the median values in the 
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sample.  It can be seen that optimal public spending on health is much more sensitive to 
changes in these values than optimal public spending on education. 
 
Table 6: Effect of a 10% Increase in the Median Value of Key Parameters  
on Optimal Spending  
 Optimal 
Spending 
at Median  
Value of 
Key 
Parameters 
Increase by 10% of the median value of each of the 
following (while keeping all other parameters constant) 
WGI GDP per 
capita 
Median 
age 
Education 
Spending 
Health 
Spending 
(Model 
Includes LIFE) 
4.14% +0.0019% +0.025% +0.27% -0.16% 
Education 
Spending 
(Model 
Includes LIFE) 
+4.12% +0.0010% 0 +0.16%  
Health 
Spending 
(Model 
Excludes LIFE) 
+3.89% +0.0024% +0.026% 0 -0.12% 
Education 
Spending 
(Model 
Excludes LIFE) 
+1.42% +0.0039% 0 +0.15%  
Note:  The median values of WGI, GDP per capita, median age of population and education 
spending are respectively -0.02938, 12758.17, 32.6 and 0.04499.  The zero entries in the 
table indicate that the change of optimal spending is negligible when these median values 
change because the relevant coefficients of the equation are tiny.  
 
Our results show that actual public spending on healthcare appears to be on average somewhat 
less than optimal, while actual public spending on education spending appears to be somewhat 
more than optimal. 12   A possible factor to consider is the relative competition effect—
competition for relative standing.  As shown by Wilkinson (1997), relative-income effects are 
                                                       
12  In favour of space considerations, these estimates are not provided here but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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very important in determining health outcomes.  This has probably to do with the 
psychosocial effects of social position.  Thus, even with higher absolute incomes and better 
healthcare, the relatively poor persons in an advanced country are typically less healthy than 
the relatively rich persons in a poor country.  Thus relative economic position affects not only 
general well-being, but also health outcomes. This may require somewhat more health 
spending to deal with the impaired health outcomes arising from inequality.  In education, the 
importance of relative competition is even much more important, to the extent that much 
education spending is explicitly aimed at improving relative positions.  A number of factors 
are involved. Admission to good educational institutions typically depends on relative 
educational outcomes. The top university gets the best (relatively) high school graduates. 
Employers also select employees at least partly based on relative education outcomes.  Thus, 
relative education outcome will affect one’s income-earning capacity. Moreover, relative 
education outcomes are also valued as such over and above the earnings implication.  As a 
result, families, and also governments in response to popular demand, invest a lot, in money, 
time, and effort to secure higher educational outcomes. However, investment in education to 
improve relative standing at the individual level may be socially wasteful as, on average, 
relative position cannot be improved at the social level, no matter how much effort and 
resources are spent. Thus, if education inputs increase, and even if effectively in pushing up 
the relative positions of some people, the net results on the welfare of the people have to be 
discounted much more by the mutually offsetting effects of relative competition.  This is 
unlikely to be fully appreciated at the family level. In addition, people may be caught in a 
prisoner-dilemma situation. This may partly explain the result of excessive spending on 
education at the social level. On the other hand, health spending is rarely aimed at improving 
relative position per se.  If health is improved, people are likely made better off.  Inadequate 
spending on healthcare could be partly due to the inadequate appreciation of the benefits due 
to the long-term nature and uncertainty in results, and partly due to the squeeze from excessive 
spending on education. 
 
The inclusion of mental quality variables in a well-being regression on government spending 
and other control variables is novel.  Table 1 compares the key coefficients including versus 
excluding the mental variables.  It can be seen that without including the mental variables the 
coefficient on “edu” becomes insignificant, making an estimate of optimal education spending 
unreliable.  Secondly, the coefficient on the interactive term health.mage (government 
healthcare spending * median age of population) carries a much bigger (almost 3 times as big) 
and much more significant positive coefficient.  The optimal spending estimates are all much 
bigger with the mental variables included than when they are not included. 
 
In the split sample regressions based on median WGI, some interesting results are obtained.  
For good governance countries, we found, through the iterative approach, that optimal 
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healthcare spending is 7.52%, much higher than the 3.14% figure for poor governance 
countries.  These results are consistent with the optimal spending of 4.3% estimated at 
average WGI, gdppc, and mage under the derivative method.  Generally, good governance 
countries also tend to have higher GDP per capita, and more advanced aging.  The 
combination of these considerations means that optimal healthcare public spending should be 
considerably higher than 4.3%.  The converse is true for poor governance countries.   
 
It is interesting to observe that all the mental quality variables carry the expected positive 
coefficients in above median WGI countries, while in below median WGI countries those who 
think of themselves as autonomous individuals and those who think being creative and doing 
things in one’s own way is important are less happy.  Good governance tends to reward 
creative people and protect personal freedoms better.  In addition, good governance generates 
greater trust in the government so that optimal government spending is higher. 
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Appendix 1:  
  Table 7: Variables from the World Value Surveys 
Question in 
Survey(Wave 
number), Variable 
Used in Paper 
Question in Survey Role of the Variable 
in the Model 
Scale 
V4(5, 6) 
L_FamImp*         
Would you say 
Family is: very 
important, rather 
important, not very 
important, or not at 
all important 
To reflect if the 
respondent loves his 
or her family.  
Scale: 1 to 4.  4 
being most 
important. Note 
ordering reversed 
from the original.   
V5(5, 6), 
L_FriImp* 
Would you say 
Friends are: very 
important, rather 
important, not very 
important, or not at 
all important 
To reflect if the 
respondent cares for 
his or her friends.  
Scale: 1 to 4.  4 
being most 
important. Note 
ordering reversed 
from the original. 
V84(5) 
V74B(6) 
L_HelpOthers* 
It is important to this 
person to help the 
people nearby; to 
care for their well-
being. 
To reflect if the 
person is a caring, 
loving person.   
Scale 1 to 6. Note 
ordering reversed 
from the original. 
V214(5) 
V216(6) 
I_Autonomous* 
I see myself as an 
autonomous 
individual. 
To reflect the 
wisdom of seeing 
self-actualization as 
more important than 
pleasing others,  
Scale of 4, original 
ordering reversed.  
4 most affirmative. 
V88(5) 
V78(6) 
I_EnvirImp* 
Looking after the 
environment is 
important to this 
person; to care for 
nature (and save life 
resources. Wave 6 
only) 
To reflect the 
wisdom of caring for 
nature and having a 
sense of balance and 
longer view.  
Scale of 6; original 
ordering reversed.  
6 most affirmative. 
V120.(5) 
V100(6) 
F_HardWork*  
In the long run, hard 
work usually brings 
a better life versus 
hard work doesn’t 
To reflect 
Engagement in the 
form of hard work as 
a purposive activity. 
Scale of 10.  10 
means: hard work 
usually brings good 
results.  Original 
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generally bring 
success—it’s more a 
matter of luck and 
connections 
scale reversed. 
V80(5) 
V70(6) 
E_Creative* 
It is important to this 
person to think up 
new ideas and be 
creative; to do things 
one’s own way.  
 
To reflect 
Engagement as being 
creative and 
assertive.  
Scale of 6, original 
ordering reversed. 6 
most affirmative. 
V46(5) 
V55(6) 
E_FreeChoice* 
How much freedom 
of choice and control 
you feel you have 
over the way your 
life turns out.  
To reflect a person’s 
sense of 
Engagement. 
Scale 1 to 10.  10 
means having a great 
deal of choice. 
V11(5, 6) 
healthstatus* 
All in all, how would 
you describe your 
state of health these 
days?  Would you 
say it is: Very good, 
good, fair, or poor 
To reflect subjective 
assessment of health 
status. 
Scale: 1 to 4, 4 being 
most healthy.  
Original scale was 
reversed. 
V22(5) 
V23(6) 
Sat* 
Or total life 
satisfaction 
All things 
considered, how 
satisfied are you 
with your life as a 
whole these days? 
Using this card on 
which 1 means you 
are “completely 
dissatisfied” and 10 
means you are 
“completely 
satisfied” where 
would you put your 
satisfaction with 
your life as a whole? 
This is the key 
subjective well-
being question the 
answer to which 
becomes our 
dependent variable.  
Scale 1 to 10, 10 
being most satisfied. 
wave5 Dummy for Wave 5 To reflect the 
influence of being in 
wave 5 
Dummy variable, 1 
=wave 5, 0=wave 6 
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V237(5)    
V242(6)  
age 
Interviewees’ age To reflect the 
influence of age 
Scale 15 to 99 
agesq Age squared To reflect non-
linearity 
 
V235(5) 
V240(6) 
female 
Code respondent’s 
sex by observation 
To reflect the 
influence of gender 
Dummy variable, 1 
=female and 0=male 
V238(5) 
V248(6) 
edu 
What is the highest 
educational level that 
you have attained?  
To reflect the 
influence of 
education level 
1-9, 1=no formal 
education, 
9=University-level 
V187(5) 
V147(6) 
religious** 
Independently of 
whether you attend 
religious services or 
not, would you say 
you are?  
To reflect the 
influence of being 
religious 
Dummy variable, 
1=a religious person, 
2=not a religious 
person 
V55(5) 
V57(6) 
married*** 
Are you 
currently….. 
married?   
To reflect the 
influence of being 
married 
Dummy variable, 
1=married or living 
together, 
2=otherwise 
V55(5) 
V57(6) 
DSorW*** 
Are you currently…. 
Divorced, separated 
or widowed?  
To reflect the 
influence of being 
divorced, separated 
or widowed 
Dummy variable, 
1=divorced, 
separated or 
widowed, 
0=otherwise 
V241(5) 
V229(6) 
partself**** 
Are you employed 
now or not? If yes, 
about how many 
hours a week? If 
more than one job: 
only for the main job 
To reflect the 
influence of being a 
part time employee 
or self-employed 
Dummy variable, 
1=part time 
employee or self-
employed, 
0=otherwise 
V241(5) 
V229(6) 
retired**** 
Are you employed 
now or not? If yes, 
about how many 
hours a week? If 
more than one job: 
only for the main job 
To reflect the 
influence of being 
retired 
Dummy variable, 
1=retired/pensioned, 
0=otherwise 
V241(5) Are you employed To reflect the Dummy variable, 
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V229(6) 
housewife**** 
now or not? If yes, 
about how many 
hours a week? If 
more than one job: 
only for the main job 
influence of being a 
housewife 
1=housewife, 
0=otherwise 
V241(5) 
V229(6) 
student**** 
Are you employed 
now or not? If yes, 
about how many 
hours a week? If 
more than one job: 
only for the main job 
To reflect the 
influence of being a 
student 
Dummy variable, 
1=student, 
0=otherwise 
V241(5) 
V229(6) 
unemployed**** 
Are you employed 
now or not? If yes, 
about how many 
hours a week? If 
more than one job: 
only for the main job 
To reflect the 
influence of being 
unemployed 
Dummy variable, 
1=unemployed, 
0=otherwise 
V68(5) 
V59(6) 
finsat 
How satisfied are 
you with the 
financial situation of 
your household? 
To reflect subjective 
assessment of 
financial status. 
Scale 1 to 10, 10 
most satisfied 
V253(5) 
V239(6) 
incomedecile 
We would like to 
know in what group 
your household is. 
Please, specify the 
appropriate number, 
counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions 
and other incomes 
that come in. 
To reflect income 
level 
Scale 1 to 10, 10 
being highest group 
* These variables are rescaled to 0 to 10 in the regressions in order to facilitate comparison of 
the magnitudes of their influences.  
**The original options are: 1=A religious person, 2=Not a religious person, 3=An atheist.  
***The original options are: 1=Married, 2=Living together as married, 3=Divorced, 
4=Separated, 5=Widowed, 6=Single.  
****The original options are: 1=Full time employee, 2=Part time employee, 3=Self 
employed, 4=Retired/pensioned, 5=Housewife not otherwise employed, 6=Student, 
7=Unemployed, 8=Other.  
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Table 8:  Other Variables 
Variable Used in 
Paper 
Definition Expected Effect 
on subjective 
well-being 
Source 
R The initial spending 
ratio used in the 
iteration procedure 
testing for 
optimality. 
Not applicable Calculated as average of 
actual spending ratio. 
r Actual spending 
ratio for each 
country, used in flow 
chart only. 
Not applicable Relevant spending ratios 
from World Bank, IMF, or 
official statistical office of 
relevant government. 
WGI Aggregate  
governance 
indicators for 215 
countries and 
territories for six 
dimensions of 
governance. 
Positive www.govindicators.org  
gdppc Gross domestic 
product based on 
purchasing-power-
parity (PPP) per 
capita GDP (Current 
international dollar) 
Not used stand 
alone in the 
ordered probit 
regression 
http://knoema.com/IMFWE
O2013Oct/imf‐world‐
economic‐outlook‐october‐
2013 
 
mage Median age of 
population in 2010 
Not used stand 
alone in the 
ordered probit 
regression 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wi
ki/List_of_countries_by_me
dian_age#cite_note‐3   
health  Public sector health 
expenditure as % of 
GDP 
Positive http://data.worldbank.org/  
health2 health squared Negative By calculation 
health.WGI health*WGI Positive By calculation 
health.mage health*median age Positive By calculation 
health.gdppc health*GDP per 
capita 
To be determined By calculation 
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health.edu health*edu Negative By calculation 
edu Education 
expenditure by the 
government as % of 
GDP 
Positive http://data.worldbank.org/  
edu2 edu squared Negative By calculation 
edu.WGI edu*WGI Positive By calculation 
edu.mage edu*median age To be determined By calculation 
edu.gdppc edu*GDP per capita To be determined By calculation 
govt Total government 
expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
Positive http://datamarket.com/data/s
et/1h79/general-
government-total-
expenditure-percent-of-
gdp#!ds=1h79!1ewr&displa
y=line","http://datamarket.c
om/data/set/1h79/general-
government-total-
expenditure-percent-of-
gdp#!ds=1h79!1ewr&displa
y=line  
govt2 govt squared Negative By calculation 
govt.WGI govt*WGI Positive By calculation 
govt.mage govt*median age To be determined By calculation 
govt.gdppc govt*GDP per capita To be determined By calculation 
devhealth Absolute deviation 
of actual public 
sector health 
spending from the 
share tested for 
optimality 
Negative if R is 
indeed optimal 
since deviating 
from optimal 
reduces well-being 
By calculation using 
formula |r-R|.  r is actual 
public sector health 
spending.  R is the level of 
public sector health 
spending being tested for 
optimality. 
devedu Absolute deviation 
of actual public 
sector education 
spending from the 
share tested for 
optimality  
Negative if R is 
indeed optimal 
since deviating 
from optimal 
reduces well-being 
By calculation using 
formula |r-R|.  r is actual 
public sector education 
spending.  R is the level of 
public sector education 
spending being tested for 
optimality. 
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devgovt Absolute deviation 
of actual total 
government 
spending from the 
share tested for 
optimality 
Negative if R is 
indeed optimal 
since deviating 
from optimal 
reduces well-being 
By calculation using 
formula |r-R|.  r is actual 
total government spending.  
R is the level of total public 
sector spending being tested 
for optimality. 
Notes: 
The public sector health spending of Hong Kong is from Hong Kong Medical Journal: 
http://www.hkmj.org/system/files/2013-S7.pdf . The public sector health spending of Taiwan 
is from Ministry of Health and Welfare, Taiwan.  
The public sector education spending of China is from cohort of Statistics of the People's 
Republic of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/AnnualData/. The public 
sector education spending of Taiwan is from Republic of China (Taiwan): 
http://www.stat.gov.tw/ .  
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Appendix 2: The Iterative Method of Estimating Optimal Government Spending 
 
The iterative approach can be explained using a flow chart (Figure 1): 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Iterative Approach to Estimate Optimal Public Spending  
(H in the flow chart is Total Life Satisfaction) 
 
Estimation starts with assuming that the average of actual spending (expressed as % of GDP) 
is the optimal spending for the sample countries.  This tested ratio R, if indeed correct, would 
imply that any deviation from R, whether above or below, would reduce subjective well-being.  
So we calculate, for each country, the absolute value of the deviation of the actual spending 
from R.  We expect that the deviation would carry a negative and significant coefficient in the 
ordered probit regression with all the relevant variables.  
 
We will then add an increment (0.1% or 1%, depending on whether we are seeking optimal 
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categorical spending or total spending) to government spending, which may be positive or 
negative, and do a re-run of the regression.  If the increment produces a negative coefficient 
with a bigger z-score, we know we are in the right direction, and continue to add a further 
increment, re-estimate the regression, and keep going on until the negative z-statistics peaks.  
The optimal spending should be R plus the increment tried that yielded the highest negative z-
statistic.   
 
The iterative method has the advantage that it could also offer more precise estimate of optimal 
spending because small increments in each direction are tested.  In contrast, the derivative 
approach is subject to a particular functional form, namely the quadratic specification. 
Sometimes the second order conditions for optimality may not be satisfied.  As we can see, 
when the derivative approach fails to yield an optimal spending, the iterative method may still 
generate meaningful results. 
 
Still, a limitation of the iterative approach is that we cannot use the interactive variable to 
estimate the marginal impact of, say, governance, on optimal spending.  Since we expect that 
optimal government spending rises with better government quality, we can divide the sample 
of countries into two subsamples: those with above average government quality indicators, and 
those with below average government quality indicators. 
 
Apart from the “derivative approach”, we use an iterative approach to provide cross checks and 
perhaps more precise estimation of optimal spending.  This iterative method, however, cannot 
identify how optimal spending varies with such factors as demographics.  We will describe 
this in the appendix.  
 
In order to demonstrate the application of the iterative approach, we follow the method as 
outlined in the flow chart above and obtained the following iterations in the search for optimal 
total spending for above median WGI countries: 
 
Here total_X means the average total government spending (as share of GDP) MINUS X%.  
totalX means average total government spending (share of GDP) PLUS X%.  The z score is 
the z statistic on the absolute deviation from the figure tested for optimality. 
 
For the above median WGI countries, average total government spending is 36.45% of GDP.  
The iteration highlighted in the table below shows a z that represents a peak.  This suggests 
that 36.45% +3% or 39.45% is the optimal government spending.  This compares with the 
average of optimal government spending estimates of 36.49% estimated using the derivative 
approach.  Table 9 presents the z statistic for a series of iterations: 
 
33 
 
 
Table 9: Iterations and z Scores in Search of Optimal Total Government Spending for  
Above Median WGI Countries 
Iteration z 
total_2 -11.3869 
total_1 -12.5952 
total_0 -13.917 
total1 -15.2162 
total2 -16.1099 
total3 -16.2124 
total4 -16.0232 
total5 -15.8062 
total6 -15.6537 
total7 -15.5316 
total8 -15.0767 
 
Corresponding to the iteration “total3”, the estimated ordered probit equation is presented in 
Table 10: 
 
Table 10: Ordered Probit Regression on Total Life Satisfaction 
Corresponding to Iteration “total3” (Above Median WGI Countries) 
 Coef. z P>|z|   
    L_FamImp  0.03787 9.27 0.000 Log likelihood -87481.5
    L_FriImp  0.00972 4.61 0.000 Number of obs 48,569
L_HelpOthers  0.00887 3.71 0.000 LR chi2(29) 20378.48
I_Autonomous  0.01271 7.38 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
  I_EnvirImp  0.01405 6.68 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.1043
  F_HardWork  0.00633 3.86 0.000   
  E_Creative  0.01008 5.11 0.000   
E_FreeChoice  0.11130 49.58 0.000   
healthstatus  0.09140 46.89 0.000   
       wave5  0.00154 0.16 0.872   
         age  -0.01093 -5.88 0.000   
       agesq  0.00013 6.49 0.000   
      female  0.05091 5.10 0.000   
         edu  -0.01602 -6.84 0.000   
   religious  0.09842 9.63 0.000   
     married  0.15452 10.85 0.000   
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       DSorW  -0.02990 -1.56 0.118   
    partself  -0.03989 -2.87 0.004   
     retired  0.03532 1.88 0.060   
   housewife  0.08201 4.42 0.000   
     student  0.06996 3.20 0.001   
  unemployed  -0.03957 -2.07 0.038   
      finsat  0.18303 75.91 0.000   
incomedecile  0.01277 4.96 0.000   
        WGI  0.20442 21.00 0.000   
    devgovt3  -1.26470 -16.21 0.000   
       /cut1  0.66130   
       /cut2  0.98099   
       /cut3  1.39344   
       /cut4  1.75178   
       /cut5  2.30664   
       /cut6  2.74808   
       /cut7  3.37827   
       /cut8  4.25744   
       /cut9  4.88314   
 
When we apply the iterative method to the sample of countries with below median WGI, we 
obtain, among others, the following iterations as listed in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Iterations and z Scores in Search of Optimal Total Government Spending for 
Below Median WGI Countries 
Iteration z 
     total_8  -0.49474 
     total_9  -1.6291 
    total_10  -2.87775 
    total_11  -3.56419 
    total_12  -3.96474 
    total_13  -4.13681 
    total_14  -4.13681 
 
For this sample, the average of total government spending is 31.23%.  The coefficient for the 
deviation from 31.23% (actual spending minus 31.23%, the mean) carries a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that government spending that deviates from this level may add to well-being.  
Upon testing it is found that both the coefficient and the z statistic turn negative with a negative 
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increment.  With successive iterations subtracting a bigger and bigger number from 31.23% 
the negative z score peaks at -4.13681.  However, subtracting more than 13% (which 
corresponds to total government spending at 18.23% of GDP) does not change the z score, 
indicating that the optimal spending may be smaller than the observed total public spending 
among countries in the sample.  This is confirmed with a scatter diagram. (Figure 2) 
   
 
 
The ordered probit regression corresponding to the optimal iteration is presented in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 12: Ordered Probit Regression on Total Life Satisfaction 
 For Below Median WGI Countries Corresponding to Iteration “total_13” 
 Coef. z P>|z|   
    L_FamImp  0.03395 8.28 0.000 Log likelihood -114425
    L_FriImp  -0.00566 -3.14 0.002 Number of obs 58,681
L_HelpOthers  0.00135 0.63 0.530 LR chi2(29) 24013.38
I_Autonomous  -0.01502 -11.67 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
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  I_EnvirImp  0.02752 15.14 0.000 Pseudo R2 0.095
  F_HardWork  0.00587 4.28 0.000   
  E_Creative  -0.00707 -4.38 0.000   
E_FreeChoice  0.11120 61.48 0.000   
healthstatus  0.07399 44.02 0.000   
       wave5  -0.18827 -19.56 0.000   
         age  -0.01297 -7.15 0.000   
       agesq  0.00018 8.75 0.000   
      female  0.06649 6.83 0.000   
         edu  0.00399 2.09 0.036   
   religious  -0.04054 -3.94 0.000   
     married  0.11030 8.49 0.000   
       DSorW  -0.03251 -1.71 0.088   
    partself  -0.03363 -2.85 0.004   
     retired  -0.05171 -2.52 0.012   
   housewife  0.10599 7.24 0.000   
     student  -0.00185 -0.10 0.923   
  unemployed  -0.07055 -4.50 0.000   
      finsat  0.17992 88.54 0.000   
incomedecile  0.03430 14.91 0.000   
        WGI  0.22056 19.09 0.000   
  devgovt_13  -0.20929 -4.14 0.000   
       /cut1  0.19452   
       /cut2  0.50209   
       /cut3  0.89700   
       /cut4  1.24882   
       /cut5  1.86316   
       /cut6  2.28278   
       /cut7  2.77816   
       /cut8  3.36457   
       /cut9  3.75727   
To provide a check for the results obtained using the derivative approach, we will present 
iterative results for healthcare spending for above and for below median WGI countries.  Here 
health18 means adding 1.8%. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 Table 13: List of Countries/Jurisdictions Covered in the Study 
Above Median WGI Below Median WGI 
Australia Algeria 
Bulgaria Argentina 
Canada Armenia 
Chile Azerbaijan 
Cyprus Belarus 
Estonia Brazil 
Finland Burkina 
France China 
Germany Colombia 
Ghana Ecuador 
Great Britain Egypt 
Hong Kong Ethiopia 
Hungary Georgia 
Italy Guatemala 
Japan India 
Jordan Indonesia 
Malaysia Iraq 
Netherland Jordan 
New Zealand Kazakhstan 
Norway Kuwait 
Poland Kyrgyzstan 
Qatar Lebanon 
Romania Libya 
Singapore Mali 
Slovenia Mexico 
South Africa Moldova 
South Korea Morocco 
Spain Nigeria 
Sweden Pakistan 
Switzerland Peru 
Taiwan Philippines 
Trinidad Russia 
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United States Rwanda 
Uruguay Serbia 
 Thailand 
 Tunisia 
 Turkey 
 Ukraine 
 Uzbekistan 
 Viet Nam 
 Yemen 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe 
Note: Above median countries were more often included in both Wave 5 and Wave 6.  A 
country included in each wave was counted as a separate country.  Otherwise the number of 
above median and below median countries should be equal.  In principle the number of 
countries or jurisdictions above and below median WGI should be the same.  They are not the 
same because countries that had been covered in both wave 5 and wave 6 are counted as 
separate entries in splitting the sample and more above median countries were covered in both 
waves.  When repeated countries are eliminated, we have a somewhat longer list of below 
median countries. 
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Table 14: Actual and Optimal Total Public Spending                   
for Good Governance Countries/Jurisdictions Based on the Derivative Method 
Country Wave Actual Total Public 
Spending(% of GDP) 
Optimal Total Public 
Spending 
(% of GDP) 
Australia Wave6 36.83 38.93
Australia Wave5 34.87 38.81
Bulgaria Wave5 35.86 34.21
Canada Wave5 42.33 39.48
Chile Wave6 23.95 36.33
Chile Wave5 19.94 36.12
Cyprus Wave6 46.14 36.3
Cyprus Wave5 43.25 36.26
Estonia Wave6 40.99 37.17
Finland Wave5 50.31 40.81
France Wave5 53.27 37.95
Germany Wave5 46.44 39.62
Germany Wave6 44.79 39.42
Ghana Wave5 21.4 30.15
Ghana Wave6 27.62 30.13
Great Britain Wave5 39.5 38.58
Hong Kong Wave5 17.67 39.23
Hungary Wave5 50.44 36.03
Italy Wave5 47.84 36.28
Japan Wave6 38.21 38.6
Japan Wave5 34.72 38.39
Jordan Wave5 37.39 30.18
Malaysia Wave5 26.89 32.02
Malaysia Wave6 28.57 31.85
Netherland Wave6 50.24 39.94
Netherland Wave5 45.48 39.58
New Zeal Wave5 33.2 39.87
New Zeal Wave6 38.95 39.78
Norway Wave5 40.56 39.51
Poland Wave6 43.72 36.01
Poland Wave5 43.58 34.8
Qatar Wave6 28.62 34.26
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Romania Wave6 36.96 32.9
Romania Wave5 32.1 32.71
Singapore Wave6 14.13 39.17
Slovenia Wave5 42.53 37.06
Slovenia Wave6 46.77 37.04
South Africa Wave5 27.19 32.16
South Korea Wave6 22.14 35.66
South Korea Wave5 20.73 35.65
Spain Wave6 46.08 36.84
Spain Wave5 38.65 36.63
Sweden Wave6 52.92 40.49
Sweden Wave5 53.58 39.94
Switzerland Wave5 34.7 40.14
Taiwan Wave6 20.72 36.33
Taiwan Wave5 20.83 35.53
Trinidad Wave6 37.92 32.34
Trinidad Wave5 28.56 32.13
United States Wave5 35.1 37.56
United States Wave6 41.51 37.45
Uruguay Wave6 33.49 35.21
Uruguay Wave5 31.64 34.61
Average  36.45 36.49
    
*Wave5: 2004-2009; wave6: 2010-2014  
Note: For the above countries, optimal total government spending varies from 30.1 to 40.8% 
of the GDP.  This compares with the optimal government spending estimated using the 
iterative method of 39.4%.  For countries below median level of governance quality, optimal 
government size is 18.2% or less according to the iterative method and cannot be identified 
using the derivative approach.   
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Table 15: Actual and Optimal Spending for Health and for Education        
(Estimated from Full Sample) 
Country or 
Jurisdiction 
Wave* Actual 
Healthcare 
Public 
Spending 
Optimal 
Healthcare 
Public 
Spending 
Actual 
Education 
Public 
Spending 
Optimal 
Education 
Public 
Spending 
Algeria wave6 4.02 3.12 4.34 3.56 
Argentina wave5 4.4 . 4.15 3.94 
Armenia wave6 1.96 3.94 3.41 4 
Australia wave6 6.15 4.17 5.35 4.94 
Australia wave5 5.64 5.87 4.92 4.93 
Azerbaijan wave6 1.2 5.86 2.81 3.64 
Belarus wave6 3.89 3.85 4.92 4.09 
Brazil wave5 3.39 3.91 4.5 3.99 
Bulgaria wave5 4.53 3.84 3.58 4.66 
Burkina Faso wave5 4.3 5.32 4.5 3.24 
Canada wave5 6.92 2.45 4.93 5.1 
Chile wave6 3.47 6.21 4.16 4.51 
Chile wave5 2.58 5.07 3.25 4.49 
China wave6 2.87 5.30 3.57 4.06 
China wave5 1.9 4.26 2.43 4.07 
Colombia wave6 5.02 4.63 4.55 3.77 
Colombia wave5 4.43 3.48 4.13 3.69 
Cyprus wave6 3.23 3.42 7.61 4.6 
Cyprus wave5 2.71 4.17 6.88 4.6 
Ecuador wave6 2.68 4.41 4.41 3.56 
Egypt wave6 1.97 3.17 3.76 3.38 
Egypt wave5 2.12 3.01 3.82 3.53 
Estonia wave6 5 3.24 5.61 4.88 
Ethiopia wave5 2.51 5.21 5.57 3.03 
Finland wave5 6.06 1.66 6.38 5.25 
France wave5 8.51 5.81 5.7 4.93 
Georgia wave5 1.83 5.51 2.95 4.39 
Germany wave6 8.64 4.98 5.08 5.2 
Germany wave5 8.2 6.34 4.43 5.22 
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Ghana wave6 3 6.47 6.84 3.59 
Ghana wave5 3.82 2.24 6.07 3.59 
United Kingdom wave5 6.47 2.50 5.28 5.02 
Guatemala wave5 2.26 5.82 2.98 3.28 
Hong Kong wave5 2.56 3.10 4.33 5.15 
Hungary wave5 5.08 6.47 5.17 4.81 
India wave5 0.94 5.20 3.17 3.74 
Indonesia wave5 0.88 3.78 2.81 3.67 
Iran wave5 2.33 3.79 5.09 3.52 
Iraq wave6 2.1 2.85 . 3.05 
Iraq wave5 2.92 . . 2.9 
Italy wave5 6.54 . 4.56 4.94 
Japan wave6 7.55 5.81 3.61 5.16 
Japan wave5 6.52 6.67 3.58 5.14 
Jordan wave6 6.2 6.58 . 3.54 
Jordan wave5 4.75 . . 3.62 
Kazakhstan wave6 2.48 . 3.06 3.78 
Kuwait wave6 2.09 4.06 3.76 3.8 
Kyrgyzstan wave6 3.73 4.41 6.28 3.44 
Lebanon wave6 2.85 2.11 1.92 3.72 
Libya wave6 3.02 4.42 . 3.18 
Malaysia wave6 2.18 . 5.53 3.88 
Malaysia wave5 1.9 3.48 5.2 3.9 
Mali wave5 3.2 3.54 4.15 3.25 
Mexico wave6 3.11 2.59 5.2 3.79 
Mexico wave5 2.63 3.39 4.93 3.8 
Moldova wave5 4.36 3.46 7.14 4.08 
Morocco wave6 2.07 2.88 5.38 3.71 
Morocco wave5 1.68 2.98 5.5 3.7 
Netherlands wave6 9.68 2.89 5.95 5.15 
Netherlands wave5 7.14 6.00 5.47 5.12 
New Zealand wave6 8.44 6.03 6.89 5 
New Zealand wave5 6.27 5.15 6.52 5 
Nigeria wave6 1.85 5.22 . 3.06 
Norway wave5 7.93 . 6.71 5.07 
Pakistan wave6 0.96 5.80 2.21 3.15 
Peru wave6 2.81 3.09 2.66 3.74 
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Peru wave5 2.59 . 2.7 3.69 
Philippines wave6 1.65 4.11 2.65 3.5 
Poland wave6 4.85 3.95 5.17 4.7 
Poland wave5 4.31 3.60 5.41 4.6 
Qatar wave6 1.75 5.07 2.45 4.29 
Romania wave6 4.4 4.65 3.3 4.42 
Romania wave5 4.34 6.70 3.4 4.4 
Russia wave6 3.82 5.07 4.1 4.16 
Russia wave5 3.23 4.94 3.73 4.16 
Rwanda wave6 6.26 4.37 4.86 3.37 
Rwanda wave5 4.44 4.44 4.34 3.27 
Serbia wave5 6.06 2.53 4.67 4.37 
Singapore wave6 1.51 2.53 3.18 5.04 
Slovenia wave6 6.62 4.36 5.69 4.93 
Slovenia wave5 6.12 7.18 5.74 4.93 
South Africa wave5 3.35 5.41 5.29 3.89 
Korea, South wave6 3.92 5.31 4.93 4.66 
Korea, South wave5 2.83 3.45 4.29 4.66 
Spain wave6 7.04 5.26 5 4.89 
Spain wave5 5.99 5.36 4.28 4.87 
Sweden wave6 7.85 5.64 7.12 5.23 
Sweden wave5 7.34 5.86 6.91 5.18 
Switzerland wave5 6.21 5.67 5.27 5.18 
Taiwan wave6 3.76 5.58 4.38 4.69 
Taiwan wave5 3.7 6.31 4.25 4.62 
Thailand wave5 2.52 5.70 4.13 4.09 
Trinidad and Tobago wave6 2.83 5.42 3.16 4.18 
Trinidad and Tobago wave5 2.45 4.10 3.16 4.16 
Tunisia wave6 4.16 4.87 6.17 3.88 
Turkey wave6 4.87 4.81 2.86 4.02 
Turkey wave5 3.92 3.07 2.86 4.03 
Ukraine wave6 4.27 4.60 6.73 4.28 
Ukraine wave5 3.86 4.57 5.86 4.33 
United States wave6 8.4 3.44 5.33 4.79 
United States wave5 7.01 3.84 5.26 4.8 
Uruguay wave6 5.72 5.76 4.5 4.48 
Uruguay wave5 4.26 5.74 2.7 4.42 
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Uzbekistan wave6 2.75 4.83 . 3.3 
Vietnam wave5 1.73 5.29 4.89 3.69 
Yemen wave6 1.51 . 5.15 2.85 
Zambia wave5 3.66 3.05 1.76 3.24 
Zimbabwe wave6   1.52 2.5 2.91 
Average   4.13 4.33 4.55 4.17 
*Wave5: 2004‐2009; wave6: 2010‐2014 
Note: Empty boxes indicate that the optimal spending shares cannot be estimated because of 
some missing variables.  Optimal healthcare and optimal education spending under the 
iterative method are respectively 7.52% and 2.39% for above median governance countries 
and 2.14% and 4.48% for below median WBI countries. 
 
